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+Security
+========
+
+Threat model
+------------
+
+`bfs` is a command line program running on multi-user operating systems.
+Those other users may be malicious, but `bfs` should not allow them to do anything they couldn't already do.
+That includes situations where one user (especially `root`) is running `bfs` on files owned or controlled by another user.
+
+On the other hand, `bfs` implicitly trusts the user running it.
+Anyone with enough control over the command line of `bfs` or any `find`-compatible tool can wreak havoc with dangerous actions like `-exec`, `-delete`, etc.
+
+> [!CAUTION]
+> The only untrusted input that should *ever* be passed on the `bfs` command line are **file paths**.
+> It is *always* unsafe to allow *any* other part of the command line to be affected by untrusted input.
+> Use the `-f` flag, or `-files0-from`, to ensure that the input is interpreted as a path.
+
+This still has security implications, incuding:
+
+- **Information disclosure:** an attacker may learn whether particular files exist by observing `bfs`'s output, exit status, or even side channels like execution time.
+- **Denial of service:** large directory trees or slow/network storage may cause `bfs` to consume excessive system resources.
+
+> [!TIP]
+> When in doubt, do not pass any untrusted input to `bfs`.
+
+
+Executing commands
+------------------
+
+The `-exec` family of actions execute commands, passing the matched paths as arguments.
+File names that begin with a dash may be misinterpreted as options, so `bfs` adds a leading `./` in some instances:
+
+```console
+user@host$ bfs -execdir echo {} \;
+./-rf
+```
+
+This might save you from accidentally running `rm -rf` (for example) when you didn't mean to.
+This mitigation applies to `-execdir`, but not `-exec`, because the full path typically does not begin with a dash.
+But it is possible, so be careful:
+
+```console
+user@host$ bfs -f -rf -exec echo {} \;
+-rf
+```
+
+
+Race conditions
+---------------
+
+Like many programs that interface with the file system, `bfs` can be affected by race conditions&mdash;in particular, "[time-of-check to time-of-use](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time-of-check_to_time-of-use)" (TOCTTOU) issues.
+For example,
+
+```console
+user@host$ bfs / -user user -exec dangerous_command {} \;
+```
+
+is not guaranteed to only run `dangerous_command` on files you own, because another user may run
+
+```console
+evil@host$ mv /path/to/file /path/to/exile
+evil@host$ mv ~/malicious /path/to/file
+```
+
+in between checking `-user user` and executing the command.
+
+> [!WARNING]
+> Be careful when running `bfs` on directories that other users have write access to, because they can modify the directory tree while `bfs` is running, leading to unpredictable results and possible TOCTTOU issues.
+
+
+Output sanitization
+-------------------
+
+In general, printing arbitrary data to a terminal may have [security](https://hdm.io/writing/termulation.txt) [implications](https://dgl.cx/2023/09/ansi-terminal-security#vulnerabilities-using-known-replies).
+On many platforms, file paths may be completely arbitrary data (except for NUL (`\0`) bytes).
+Therefore, when `bfs` is writing output to a terminal, it will escape non-printable characters:
+
+<pre>
+user@host$ touch $'\e[1mBOLD\e[0m'
+user@host$ bfs
+.
+./$'\e[1mBOLD\e[0m'
+</pre>
+
+However, this is fragile as it only applies when outputting directly to a terminal:
+
+<pre>
+user@host$ bfs | grep BOLD
+<strong>BOLD</strong>
+</pre>
+
+
+Code quality
+------------
+
+Every correctness issue in `bfs` is a potential security issue, because acting on the wrong path may do arbitrarily bad things.
+For example:
+
+```console
+root@host# bfs /etc -name passwd -exec cat {} \;
+```
+
+should print `/etc/passwd` but not `/etc/shadow`.
+`bfs` tries to ensure correct behavior through careful programming practice, an extensive testsuite, and static analysis.
+
+`bfs` is written in C, which is a memory unsafe language.
+Bugs that lead to memory corruption are likely to be exploitable due to the nature of C.
+We use [sanitizers](https://github.com/google/sanitizers) to try to detect these bugs.
+Fuzzing has also been applied in the past, and deploying continuous fuzzing is a work in progress.
+
+
+Supported versions
+------------------
+
+`bfs` comes with [no warranty](/LICENSE), and is maintained by [me](https://tavianator.com/) and [other volunteers](https://github.com/tavianator/bfs/graphs/contributors) in our spare time.
+In that sense, there are no *supported* versions.
+However, as long as I maintain `bfs` I will attempt to address any security issues swiftly.
+In general, security fixes will we part of the latest release, though for significant issues I may backport fixes to older release series.
+
+
+Reporting a vulnerability
+-------------------------
+
+If you think you have found a sensitive security issue in `bfs`, you can [report it privately](https://github.com/tavianator/bfs/security/advisories/new).
+Or you can [report it publicly](https://github.com/tavianator/bfs/issues/new); I won't judge you.